Resilience: The Grand Strategy by Palin, Philip J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2010-01-00
Resilience The Grand Strategy
Palin, Philip J.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Homeland Security Affairs (January 2010), v.6 no.1
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/25057
Resilience: The Grand Strategy 
Philip J. Palin 
Homeland security does not have a Grand Strategy. There have been national strategies.  
There are a plethora of operational strategies. In The Edge of Disaster, Steve Flynn 
recommends resiliency as an over-arching goal.1 Many have murmured agreement and 
the word is increasingly common in speeches and other pronouncements. But as an 
official with responsibility for resilience recently asked in private, “What does it mean?” 
The military historian and theorist B.H. Liddell Hart argued, “While the horizon of 
strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent 
peace.”2 The grand strategy of the United States during the Cold War was captured in a 
single word: containment. The meaning of containment prompted considerable 
contentiousness, even while the insight the term provided is widely credited with 
strategic success.   
There is no serious dispute that George Kennan’s 1946 Long Telegram is the origin of 
containment as the touch-stone of our Cold War strategy. Recently, I authored a Long 
Blog3 trying to make strategic sense of resilience. Kennan eventually reworked his 
original, which Foreign Affairs published as “Sources of Soviet Conduct.”4 I appreciate 
the invitation from Homeland Security Affairs to offer a similar reworking of the Long 
Blog. 
 
In his Long Telegram,5 George Kennan outlines five related understandings. He 
observes reality, gives context to his observations, projects these findings on official 
policy, acknowledges the role of unofficial policy, and offers practical deductions… or 
what I would call strategy.  I will follow the same organizational schema: 
(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook risks to the United States; 
(2) Background of this outlook perspective on risk; 
(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level; 
(4) Its projection on unofficial level; 
(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of U.S. policy. 
Kennan urges readers to recognize a Soviet take on reality. Kennan’s argument aims to 
engage, manage, manipulate — choose your verb — the orientation of our adversary.  
Sixty-plus years later, the most serious risks facing the United States are where a range 
of threats, some traditional and some novel, interact with several vulnerabilities Kennan 
did not face. Where Kennan focuses intently on the Soviet threat, our threats are more 
numerous and nuanced.  The recent National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) is helpful in 
PALIN, RESILIENCE 
        
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
	  
2	  
scanning the horizon.6 Can we derive the same sort of logical policy premises that 
Kennan found? 
PART ONE: Basic Features of the Principal Risks to the United 
States 
The principal risks are as follows: 
a) According to the NIS there are four nation-states that present a “challenge to U.S. 
interests.”  These are Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia. None present the near-
peer level of competition offered by the Soviet Union immediately after WWII.  
Individually or in concert these competitors can constrain the U.S. But even in 
unlikely combination these nation-states do not present the clear-and-present 
danger the Stalinist superpower seemed to threaten. (This shift, more a matter of 
human will than fewer warheads, also demonstrates the importance of keeping the 
nuclear genie contained.) 
b) Violent extremist groups, insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations 
“increasingly impact our national security” according to the NIS. But the capacity of 
these groups to threaten the U.S. with catastrophic harm is modest. We should not 
discount the potential terrorist or even criminal use of WMD.7 But a reasonable and 
sustained application of the precautionary principle should suffice to manage this 
risk (see Cass Sunstein).8 A debate regarding the specific meaning of reasonable and 
sustained could be entirely worthwhile. 
c) The global economic crisis has been identified by Dennis Blair, director of national 
intelligence, as the “primary near-term security concern” for the United States. 9 
The dependence of the Unites States on foreign holders of debt (especially China), 
efforts to replace the dollar as the principal international reserve currency, the 
prospect of U.S. hyper-inflation, and a growing sense of financial limitation all 
increase the nation’s  strategic vulnerability. 
d) Failed states and ungoverned spaces nurture possibilities available to violent 
extremists, insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations, according to the 
NIS.  Unconnectedness, ala Thomas P.M. Barnett, breeds all sorts of ugliness.10 
e) Climate change11 and energy competition will present new casus belli and heart-
wrenching humanitarian crises. The NIS treats the two as one significant source of 
instability. 
f) “Rapid technological change and dissemination of information continue to alter 
social, economic, and political forces, providing new means for our adversaries and 
competitors to challenge us” is how the NIS describes the threat.  The report goes on 
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to note, “While also providing the United States with new opportunities to preserve 
or gain competitive advantage.” 
g) Pandemic disease is listed by the NIS as “a persistent challenge to global health, 
commerce, and economic well-being.” 
Kennan also listed his “basic features” as running from (a) to (g). From seven basic 
features Kennan derived – or at least argued – four fundamental deductions. Kennan’s 
deductions de-mystify the strategic perspective of the Soviet leadership. It is a reality 
warped by ideology. But precisely because Soviet perception is so ideologically 
blinkered, it is predictable. Kennan argued the U.S. could best advance its interests 
when it acted with this predictable worldview as a principal target. 
Kennan could focus on threat analysis. Today the NIS outlines a much more 
complicated mix of threats and vulnerabilities. By any measure the U.S. is much 
stronger than it was in 1946. But we are also more vulnerable. Insight regarding external 
threat is no longer sufficient. We also require a self-awareness of vulnerability.  (Threat 
x Vulnerability) x Consequences = Risk. 
If the assessment of our context provided above – and by the National Intelligence 
Strategy – is reasonably accurate, the other-awareness advocated by Kennan is no 
longer sufficient. Many threats confronting the United States today are beyond 
the scope of accurate analysis or, even, consensus judgment. The unpredictability of the 
H1N1 pandemic is good evidence. The potential implications of climate change, resource 
shortages, and the range of weapons and targets available to our adversaries challenge 
the imagination and arguably exceed our analytical capacity. 
A colleague who served for many years in the intelligence community has critiqued 
the National Intelligence Strategy as fatally flawed because it is so far-reaching. In his 
view it is undisciplined in target-selection and thereby condemns the intelligence 
community to almost certain failure. Limited assets will be stretched too thin. 
His operational concern is undeniable. Yet I perceive the greater flaw is too narrowly 
defining threats as externalities. In 1946 the Soviet threat was clearly primus inter 
pares. In 2009 choosing among threats can seem a game of musical chairs. A deep 
knowledge of an other is helpful, but no longer sufficient. Other-awareness must be 
complemented with self-awareness. Risk emerges from threat and vulnerability.  
Threats are often beyond our reach, vulnerabilities are usually self-generated.  We 
require a deep understanding of our self.   
Kennan found four action principles flowing reasonably from his seven perceptual 
premises. For a Soviet leader who has confidence in his perception of reality, the 
prescriptions for action are self-evident.  Kennan encourages his Foggy Bottom masters 
to recognize the internal logic of the adversary’s worldview. Broadly accepting the 
worldview set out by the National Intelligence Strategy, I propose four action 
principles: 
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1. The United States is, by far, the most powerful single player on the 
planet.  More than most, we are masters of our own fate. We have the resources, 
systems, and culture to actively participate in shaping the future.  Yet some perceive the 
best days are behind us. Certainly many would say 1946 was golden compared to our 
reduced current condition. That could be a self-fulfilling prophecy, but here are three 
reassuring factoids:   
GDP compared to principal putative adversary:   
1950: U.S.: $1.45 trillion v. Soviet Union: $510 billion (1991 dollars)12 
2007: U.S.: $14.2 trillion v. China: $4.4 trillion13 
U.S. federal deficit as a percentage of GDP:14 
1946: 121.7 percent 
2009: 66.2 percent (projected) 
U.S. median household income (constant 2007 dollars): 15  
1947: $25,260 
2007: $46,207 
2. Despite our great power, the United States confronts a strategic 
context with even greater potential for instability than 1946. Today there are 
many more nodes of significant influence than in the immediate post-war period. The 
interactions — social, intellectual, economic, and political — between the various nodes 
constitute a rich web much greater than that of 1946. The spread of H1N1 was 
much faster than any prior pandemic16 and going viral is no longer limited to 
viruses. The pace of change has accelerated.  We have much more virtual proximity to – 
and real dependence on – decisions and actions occurring well outside the direct 
influence of the United States.  
3. As a result, the contemporary strategic context is much less predictable 
than 1946. Kennan’s fundamental thesis was that the ideological rigidity of the Soviet 
regime made it predictable and therefore manageable. There is evidence he was right 
and during the Cold War U.S. policymakers and strategists often (not 
always) were guided by this insight. But the range and type of challenges facing the U.S. 
today are not anywhere as predictable. Rather than a “simple” bi-polar (pun intended) 
world, we are surrounded by random outbreaks of mass neuroses and 
peculiar psychoses. 
4. With limited predictability regarding our threats, national policy and 
strategy should aim to optimize our adaptability to a range of risks.   
In setting out his four deductions Kennan is more concise – perhaps purposefully 
provocative – than the preceding. But then in Part 2 of the Long Telegram he analyzes 
“certain aspects” of what he has confidently exposed. He posits: “At bottom of Kremlin’s 
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neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.”  
(Telegraphing, like twittering, tended to dispense with articles.) 
 
PART TWO: Background of this Perspective on Risk 
Kennan argues that understanding the sources and symptoms of Soviet neurosis will 
allow U.S. decision-makers to avoid unnecessarily provoking our adversary and 
potentially take advantage of the Kremlin’s neurosis. An effective strategy engages 
perceived reality, even if the reality that matters is neurotic. 
Modern psychology has moved away from a mid-twentieth century notion of 
neurosis. When Kennan wrote, neurosis was understood as an unresolved conflict 
between unconscious motivations and explicit purpose. One psychologist explains, 
“Neurosis means poor ability to adapt to one’s environment, an inability to change one’s 
life patterns, and the inability to develop a richer, more complex, more satisfying 
personality.” 17 
The environment in which the United States finds itself has changed dramatically 
since 1946. Since, at least, the mid-1970s the speed of change has been rapid and the 
direction erratic. We have not adapted gracefully to the change. We resist changing our 
national life patterns. Similar to the Soviet leadership, so helpfully analyzed by Kennan, 
we are increasingly neurotic in our effort to justify inconsistencies between our self-
image and experience. 
The strategic context emerging from this period of rapid change has not, by-and-
large, been friendly to the attitudes and habits Americans developed immediately after 
World War II. We have become more and more dependent on increasingly expensive 
foreign sources of energy. Other nations, and alliances of nations, have emerged as 
competent competitors. Our comparative advantage in a wide array of fields has 
narrowed or we find ourselves at a disadvantage. An industrial economy has been 
succeeded by a consumer economy with its own precarious tendencies. Our financial 
indebtedness, both foreign and domestic, has increased dramatically. Our unequalled 
military prowess has been unable to forestall the first successful foreign attack on the 
continental U.S. since the War of 1812. Even the “defeat” of our Soviet enemy has not 
seemed to produce a practical return. We are undoubtedly the most powerful nation on 
the planet.  But it sure doesn’t feel like it. 
In Man and His Symbols, Carl Gustav Jung offers, 
In order to sustain his creed, contemporary man pays the price in a remarkable lack 
of introspection. He is blind to the fact that, with all his rationality and efficiency, he 
is possessed by “powers” that are beyond his control. His gods and demons have not 
disappeared at all; they have merely got new names. They keep him on the run with 
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restlessness, vague apprehensions, psychological complications, an insatiable need 
for pills, alcohol, tobacco, food — and, above all, a large array of neuroses… 
 Mankind is now threatened by self-created and deadly dangers that are growing 
beyond our control. Our world is, so to speak, dissociated like a neurotic…  Western 
man, becoming aware of the aggressive will to power of the East, sees himself forced 
to take extraordinary measures of defense, at the same time as he prides himself on 
his virtue and good intentions.18 
Jung does not — and certainly I do not — suggest resolving the neurosis by denying our 
good intentions or presumption to virtue. But neither will any resolution come from a 
willful denial of our struggle to square what we believe with what we have done or 
perceive we must do. 
We have in the Department of Homeland Security and its various concerns a totem 
giving form to a wide range of unresolved conflicts: liberty v. security, insider v. 
outsider, privacy v. transparency, individual v. community, local v. national, good v. 
evil… the list of dichotomies could continue. Never before has a single government 
agency served as a repository for so many potential neuroses.  It’s predisposition to 
neurosis is especially strong because of its domestic – we could say, self-absorbed – 
focus. 
Nearly a century has passed since Sigmund Freud wrote an essay (later to become 
Totem and Taboo) entitled “On Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of 
Savages and Neurotics.”19 In this he offers that totemism is an elaborate, ritualized effort 
to resolve the deep ambivalence that exists in most fearing what we most love. In 
creating the totem we attempt to externalize and objectify the ambivalence that is the 
source of our neurosis. But without great care, the totem can merely institutionalize 
both ambivalence and neurosis. Something more is required to resolve the tension. Is 
this why St. Elizabeth’s has been selected for the new DHS headquarters?20 
Kennan’s key to defending the United States is to recognize and, when appropriate, 
exploit Soviet neuroses. To defend the United States and advance our interests in the 
twenty-first century we must attend effectively to our own neuroses. 
President Bush famously asked of the 9/11 terrorists, “Why do they hate us?”21 He 
answered the question, “They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom 
of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.” The 
terrorists hate us for our virtues. While the values argument put forth by Mr. Bush 
should not be dismissed, Osama bin-Laden offers a considerably different rationale. 
It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam had suffered from 
aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance 
and their collaborators; to the extent that the Muslims’ blood became cheap and their 
wealth became as loot in the hands of the enemies. Their blood was spilled in 
Palestine and Iraq. The horrifying pictures of the massacre of Qana, in Lebanon, are 
still fresh in our memory. Massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the 
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Philippines, Fatani, Ogadin, Somalia, Eritria, Chechnya and in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina took place, massacres that send shivers through the body and shake the 
conscience. All of this the world watched and heard, yet not only didn’t respond to 
these atrocities, but also, with a clear conspiracy between the USA and its allies and 
under the cover of the iniquitous United Nations, the dispossessed people were even 
prevented from obtaining arms to defend themselves.22 
These massacres are unfamiliar to most Americans. U.S. culpability for these horrific 
events will strike most as absurd. Yet Osama bin-Laden is not alone in finding 
Americans complicit in the unjust suffering of Muslim millions.  According to recent 
surveys, most Pakistanis readily agree.23  
Even in seeking to do good, we can cause suffering. In his assessment of our situation 
in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal explains: 
Preoccupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner 
that distances us — physically and psychologically — from the people we seek to 
protect.  In addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins 
that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage.  The insurgents 
cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.24 
A United Nations report found that in the first six months of 2009, three hundred 
Afghan civilian casualties – roughly 30 percent of the total – were caused by coalition 
forces.25 During the same period the U.S./NATO coalition suffered nearly the same 
number of fatalities.26 In a September interview with 60 Minutes Gen. McChrystal said, 
“Since I’ve been here the last two and a half months, this civilian casualty issue is much 
more important than I even realized. It is literally how we lose the war or in many ways 
how we win it.”  
 In pursuing peace we have killed the innocent. In defending freedom we have 
imprisoned – and worse – those who have done us no harm. We have betrayed what we 
love in an effort to protect what we love. Yet it would be a serious error to see this 
as merely hypocritical or cynical. During the eight years of our current war there have, 
no doubt, been instances of hypocrisy and cynicism. But it is crucial to acknowledge 
these seeming contradictions as the inevitably tragic consequence of exercising power. 
Purity of purpose is hard enough.  Purity of practice is beyond our capacity. As Reinhold 
Niebuhr observes, 
The tragic element in the human situation is constituted of conscious choices of 
evil for the sake of good. If men or nations do evil in a good cause, they cover 
themselves with guilt in order to fulfill some high responsibility; or if they 
sacrifice some high value for the sake of a higher or equal one, they make a tragic 
choice. 27 
The powerful cannot avoid tragedy. It is innate to the nature of power. As our national 
power has multiplied, so has our tragic potential. But the American psyche struggles to 
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deny this reality. We point to innocent intention. We seek individual scapegoats —
Lynndie England or Dick Cheney — for our collective guilt. We propagate neuroses to 
obscure our role in tragedy.  
Our effort to escape tragedy is more threatening to our integrity of purpose — and 
essential innocence — than any tragic choice we undertake. In refusing to embrace the 
tragic, we invite a much more insidious condition. Niebuhr continues, 
If virtue becomes vice through some hidden fault of virtue; if strength becomes 
weakness because of the vanity to which strength may prompt the mighty man or 
nation; if security is transmuted into insecurity because too much reliance is 
placed upon it; if wisdom becomes folly because it does not know its own limits — 
in all such cases the situation is ironic… It is differentiated from tragedy because 
by the fact that the responsibility is related to an unconscious weakness rather 
than to a conscious resolution. 28 
The United States ought not deny the paradox inherent to power. It is self-deluding to 
indulge our neuroses in seeking to avoid the tragic. In Lear the plot is set when the old 
King is unwilling to accept Cordelia’s honest, if paradoxical, expression of love. From 
Lear’s vanity and denial unfolds catastrophe. (Ponder sea coast construction in 
hurricane country, urban wildfire, flood plain development, and much more.) 
There is plenty of death and disaster in Oedipus the King, but Sophocles’ masterpiece 
conforms closer to my own hope for the United States. By most measures Oedipus lives 
a happy and productive life. The trouble he causes is as unintentional as it is inevitable. 
And in contrast to Lear, the trouble caused by Oedipus emerges from nobility, not 
vanity. At the close of Oedipus at Colonus  the Theban king might even be said to 
transcend the tragic; but only after fully embracing his tragic condition.   
PART THREE: Its Projection in Practical Policy on Official Level 
In the third element of his five-part Long Telegram, Kennan shows how 
Kremlin neuroses can be used to predict official Soviet policies. I want to remove or 
reduce the influence of U.S. neuroses on homeland security policy and strategy. 
I have prescribed embracing the tragic. How would this untie the knots of our own 
neuroses? Four preliminary deductions have been offered: 
1. The United States is, by far, the most powerful single player on the planet.   
2. The United States confronts a strategic context even more unstable than 1946.  
3. As a result, the contemporary strategic context is much less predictable than in 
1946.  
4. With limited predictability regarding our threats, national policy and 
strategy should aim to optimize our adaptability to a range of risks. In other 
words, we should adopt a strategy of resilience. 
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If this strategic analysis is broadly accurate, it describes a situation many will find 
frustrating. In most cases, this frustration emerges from being unable to sufficiently 
influence — and certainly not control — our strategic context. Desire for control is 
closely linked to neurosis. In itself the pursuit of control creates the potential 
for cognitive dissonance. How does this jibe with our proclaimed national commitment 
to liberty? But without more control, how can we guarantee safety? 
In embracing the tragic we acknowledge very little can be guaranteed. No complex 
system can be fully controlled. Can goals be cultivated? Certainly. Encouraged?  
Absolutely. Influenced? Yes. Guaranteed? No – even the effort will amplify tragic 
consequence. The exercise of power – even when animated by noble purpose – will have 
surprising and, quite often, ignoble outcomes. Embracing the tragic gives us this 
foreknowledge. This foreknowledge need not constrain our exercise of power, but it will 
inform our expectations. It may also inform how power is exercised. 
Recognizing tragic potential, we accept the probability of surprise and 
the possibility of failure. In any community — with formal democratic traditions or not 
— this recognition encourages shared decision making. Key participants may try (and 
succeed) to manipulate the process, but even at worst the illusion of participation, 
collaboration, and shared deliberation will be fostered.  
Historically, tentative and limited participation in decision-making has often been 
extended, either through increments or revolution. Societies, cultures, and institutions 
that foster participation and 
collaboration in decision-
making seem to have a long-
term comparative advantage. 
There is a growing body of 
evidence that this comparative 
advantage emerges from how 
participative networks increase 
the feedback available to 
the system, thereby enhancing 
the ability of the system to 
maintain rough equilibrium. 
This is a key aspect of 
resilience. 
Systems that maximize feedback spawn learning. This builds knowledge, which can 
extend the boundaries within which the system maintains its equilibrium. This is not, 
mostly, a matter of formal learning, but rather the sort of learning by which complex 
systems adapt to their environment. The results can be chaotic, both figuratively and 
literally, but the outcome is enhanced resilience.   
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Defining Resilience in Action 
Consider this working definition of resilience: “(1) the ability of a system to absorb or 
buffer disturbances and still maintain its core attributes; (2) the ability of the system to 
self-organize, and (3) the capacity for learning and adaptation in the context of 
change.”29 A sense of the tragic tells us (and resilience directs our attention to) “systems 
experience changes that are unknowable and discontinuous, and involve sudden and 
dramatic flips.”30 
The last two quotes are from Governance and the Commons in a Multi-level World 
by Derek Armitage. This is one of hundreds of digital papers available from the 
International Association for the Study of the Commons. Resilience is a principal 
concern of this movement, closely related to Elinor Ostrom, the recent Nobel Laureate 
in Economics. 
Ostrom, Armitage, and others are carefully provisional in their conclusions. But 
several common attributes of the most resilient systems seem to be emerging. Drawing 
heavily on the Armitage paper, but with edits reflecting my own perspective, these 
attributes include: 
• Broad based participation, collaboration, and deliberation; 
• Multilayered and polycentric organizational structures; 
• Networked organizational structures with mutual accountability built into 
how the network functions; 
• Content-rich and meaningful interaction regularly occurring across the 
network; and 
• Facilitative and/or catalytic leadership (in sharp contrast with authoritative or 
control-oriented leadership). 
• All the preceding attributes and their activities produce knowledge of both the 
system and its environment.  
• All the preceding attributes contribute to individual and system-wide 
learning, which is the application of knowledge to maintaining and/or 
potentially extending the boundaries within which the system maintains its 
equilibrium. 
These are fundamental components of any effective resilience strategy.  Only when most 
of these attributes are reflected in strategy, operations, and tactics will our homeland 
security effort generate a long-term comparative advantage. (I have purposefully left out 
one other generally recognized common attribute: trust. This will be dealt with later.) 
When our attitudes or actions are contrary to these attributes, we contribute to our 
disadvantage. When our attitudes and actions are consistent with these attributes we 
enhance the resilience of whole system. 
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The less a system is characterized by these attributes, the more neurotic it will be; in 
other words the more dissociated from reality. Kennan recognized the deep neurosis of 
the Soviet Union’s centralizing, controlling, and excluding tendencies. He predicted its 
collapse. 
A bit more than a year after sending the Long Telegram, George Kennan reworked 
his analysis of Soviet neuroses and published “Sources of Soviet Conduct” as an 
unsigned piece in Foreign Affairs magazine. This revised and expanded text included a 
top contender for the most important single sentence of any strategy document of the 
Cold War: 
In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward 
the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of 
Russian expansive tendencies.31 
I have been trying to argue that in our current circumstances it is clear that the main 
element of any United States policy toward the risks we face must be that of long-term, 
patient but firm and vigilant extension of the boundaries within which we can achieve a 
kind of equilibrium. If this sounds odd, listen again to Brian Walker’s seven-minute 
explanation of resilience.   
This strategy is fully cognizant of our limitations, which I argue can best be 
approached by embracing the tragic. This is also a strategy that recognizes the potential 
of complex adaptive systems to preserve core identity in the midst of profound flux. 
While depending on your mastery of the previous literary analysis and the insights 
drawn from the study of the commons and complexity, I will take the risk of translating 
these arcane analogies into a direct – if very wonkish – statement of homeland 
security strategy.  
A STRATEGY OF RESILIENCE 
(With an Operational Example) 
 
The United States faces a range of natural, accidental, and intentional threats that 
cannot always be accurately predicted; as a result these threats cannot always be 
prevented. 
Accordingly, the homeland security strategy of the United States seeks to maximize 
individual, local, regional, and national capacity to: 
1. Absorb or buffer disaster while preserving and, if possible, advancing physical, 
psychological, social, economic, and constitutional integrity. 
2. Effectively observe and adapt to change while preserving or advancing physical, 
psychological, social, economic and constitutional integrity. 
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3. Learn and increase capacity to adapt to changes experienced at the local, 
regional, and national level and across social and economic sectors. 
The Secretary of Homeland Security, in cooperation with the President and other 
departments and agencies, shall undertake to: 
Support and facilitate community-based Risk and Resilience Assessments. 
These Risk and Resilience Assessments shall be undertaken on a voluntary basis. The 
Department of Homeland Security shall provide conferences, training, and expert 
facilitators to assist in completion of the Risk and Resilience Assessments. Completed 
Risk and Resilience Assessments shall qualify to compete for up to $1 billion in federal 
grants.  
Every level of government, major agencies of government, private sector 
organizations, and neighborhoods shall be encouraged to undertake Risk and 
Resilience Assessment. The Department of Homeland Security shall contract 
with well-established voluntary, not-for-profit organizations to serve as legal liaison and 
grant administrators for informal organizations or other parties (e.g., a 
neighborhood) wishing to participate in the Risk and Resilience Assessment process 
but not having status to receive federal funding. 
The Risk and Resilience Assessment process shall include local, regional, statewide, 
multi-state, and national workshops, conferences, and related digital resources to 
encourage participation, collaboration, deliberation, and interaction among those 
undertaking Risk and Resilience Assessments. 
The Citizen Corps program of the Department of Homeland Security shall be funded 
and organized to provide facilitation and expertise in the Risk and Resilience 
Assessment process. 
The Risk and Resilience Assessment process, as outlined above, shall be monitored 
by a team of expert observers/evaluators who will rapidly share lessons learned. A web-
based, peer-to-peer network will also serve as a dynamic and 
growing knowledge base for the Risk and Resilience Assessment Process. 
The Department of Homeland Security, the Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security at the Naval Postgraduate School, and the National Academy of 
Sciences shall cooperate in establishing the National Institute for Risk and Resilience to 
develop, conduct and encourage others to develop and conduct professional 
development, educational, and other learning programs related to Risk and Resilience. 
All parties completing Risk and Resilience Assessments shall be eligible to compete 
for a total pool of $1 billion per year in federal grants to address the findings of the Risk 
and Resilience Assessments. Every three months $250 million shall be awarded in the 
following tranches: 
• Up to five grants of $5 million each,  
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• Up to 25 grants of  $1 million each,  
• Up to 50 grants of $500,000 each,  
• Up to 100 grants of $250,000 each,  
• Up to 200 grants of $125,000 each,  
• Up to 1,000 grants of $40,000 each,  
• Up to 2,000 grants of $20,000 each, and  
• Up to 4,500 grants of $10,000 each.  
Recipients shall be chosen by majority vote of 500 electors drawn from nominations 
submitted by the governors of the states and territories of the United States and 
apportioned by population. After one year of service, 125 electors shall retire every 
three months and be replaced by a new class. (So that, of the inaugural class, 125 shall 
serve one year and nine months.) In this manner, beginning in the second year of 
operations, the electoral body will receive new members each quarter.  
 
The foregoing is less a proposal than a framing, and is offered primarily to demonstrate 
how the strategic principles set out might be practically implemented. There are real 
ways to encourage broad-based participation, collaboration and deliberation. It is 
possible, even for a large bureaucracy, to offer facilitative leadership and eschew 
authoritarian tendencies. It is possible to encourage local creativity and accountability. 
It might even be possible to encourage communities and the system to embrace tragic 
potential.  
I don’t expect the Department of Homeland Security, much less the entire homeland 
security establishment, to suddenly adopt a strategy of resilience. But the example is a 
doable, potentially powerful means of seeding resilience thinking and behavior. It would 
probably cost $1.3 billion per year. But please give more attention to how the attributes 
of resilience are being seeded. The seeds of the first season should multiply in 
subsequent seasons. With care – and some fortuitous emergence – we might even be 
creating a new commons, a widely-shared resource for enhanced understanding of risk 
and resilience. 
PART FOUR: Its Projection on Unofficial Level 
In the fourth part of his five-part Long Telegram, George Kennan addresses how Soviet 
neuroses play out in unofficial behavior. I have set out how the U.S. could reduce its 
neurotic stance on homeland security through official policy and strategy. But 
the effectiveness of the proposed measures depends on a range of unofficial attitudes 
and actions. Even if not precisely unofficial, effectiveness depends on serious 
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engagement with messy, subjective, very human attributes that “official” policy and 
strategy often seek to exclude. 
In considering the example above, I hope readers worried whether sufficiently 
rigorous standards were established for awarding the proposed federal grants. It would 
be even more satisfying to be challenged on the competence of the 500 electors to assess 
the grant requests. (The number is based on the jury that convicted Socrates to death, a 
rhetorical gift to skeptics.) 
These concerns reflect our current official norms. These norms emerged from a 
salutary process, now more than a century old, to reduce the corrupt influence of 
personal preference and increase the role of expertise in making official decisions. I 
perceive these norms and their related processes have reached a stage of rococo 
decrepitude. Official norms now discourage community-based participation, 
collaboration, and deliberation. Our official norms now stand in the way of the kind of 
communication and other behaviors that create resiliency. 
Armitage et al. have identified key attributes of resilient communities. My previous 
listing did not include the potentially most important — and admittedly mysterious — 
attribute: Trust. In studying the commons, and in distinguishing between common 
resources that are over-harvested and those sustainably harvested, trust has been 
identified as an essential attribute of successful self-organization. In the literature 
trust is sometimes characterized as requiring two elements: a shared set of preferences 
and expectations of future interactions. 
This notion of trust makes enormous sense to a small town boy. I work best with 
those who broadly share similar goals and with whom I expect to continue working.  I 
work best with my friends. But our official norms — well beyond homeland security — 
have become so neurotic that friendship is actively discouraged. No wonder so many feel 
dissociated from our political culture, the process of governance, and — at worst — from 
reality itself. 
In a paper written last year, Elinor Ostrom explores the foundations of trust. In the 
monograph, Building Trust to Solve Common Dilemmas: Taking Small Steps to Test an 
Evolving Theory of Collective Action, the Nobel-winning political economist sets out 
that the following variables seem to be highly correlated with trust and cooperation: 
• Information about past actions is made available; 
• Repeated interactions occur with the same set of participants; 
• Participants can signal one another by sending pre-structured information; 
• Prescriptions are adopted and enforced that when followed do lead to higher 
outcomes; 
• Participants are able to engage in full communication (via writing or “chat room” 
without knowing the identity of the others involved); 
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• Participants are able to engage in full communication with known others (via 
face-to-face discussions or other mechanisms); 
• In addition to communication, participants can sanction (or reward) each other 
for the past actions they have taken; and 
• Participants can design their own rules related to levels of cooperation and 
sanctions that are to be assigned to those who do not follow agreed-upon rules.32 
Dr. Ostrom also reports that three variables seem to be highly correlated with lack of 
cooperation and the absence of trust: 
• One-shot interactions; 
• Full anonymity – current actions taken by an individual cannot be attributed to 
that individual by anyone else; and 
• No information is available to one participant about the others involved. 
Which set of variables more accurately represents your typical interaction with the 
Department of Homeland Security or other expressions of government? Perhaps we 
have the first clues for diagnosing the sources of our political discontent. Have our 
current norms and processes succeeded in excluding official corruption and cronyism? 
No, they have not. But in a tragedy-inviting effort to control the bad, we have 
undermined the good. We have discouraged broad-based participation, collaboration, 
and deliberation. We have discouraged effective communication. We have become 
suspicious of friendship. 
Our neurosis erupts in surprising ways and places. But we can resolve the neurosis 
with self-awareness, embracing the tragic, and self-consciously adopting the attitudes 
and behaviors most conducive to resilience. 
PART FIVE: Practical Deductions from Standpoint of U.S. Policy 
From the closing paragraphs of the Long Telegram: 
 
(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is 
like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which 
domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to 
solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, 
morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over 
Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot 
abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, 
Moscow will profit–Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign 
policies… 
(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own 
methods and conceptions of human society. After Al [sic], the greatest danger 
PALIN, RESILIENCE 
        
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
	  
16	  
that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism is that we 
shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping. 
 
KENNAN 
800.00B International Red Day/2 - 2546: Airgram 
 
Fundamental to Kennan’s foreign policy is an effective — we might even say, resilient — 
domestic policy. The stronger and more differentiated our internal condition, the less 
opportunity we give any external threat. As his later writings confirm — and is inferred 
by the final paragraph above — Kennan is not much concerned with the strength of 
domestic security. Rather, the social, political, and economic vitality of the nation is our 
best defense (and offense, too). The more we solve domestic “deficiencies” the stronger 
our international position.  
Much of our thinking and talking about homeland security is homeostatic. We focus 
on prevention and protection. We talk about recovery. We seem to seek to minimize 
change. It sounds like we are aiming to preserve the status quo. But this language 
obscures — and may actually complicate — achievement of our real goal, which is much 
more about adaptability, optimization, and growth. We want to solve our deficiencies. 
A complex system self-organizes around a point of equilibrium. This is good; we 
usually don’t want the system to lose its core characteristics. But do we really want to 
always return to the same or very similar point? (The Greek homoios = similar is the 
origin of homeo in homeostasis.) This has not been the goal — or historical experience — 
of the United States. We want the stable sense of being in the same place. But we have 
also wanted our equilibrium point to move (up) — economically and in regards to justice 
and freedom. It has been the American tendency to seek a kind of heterostasis, a 
stability that encompasses a depth and breadth of positive change. 
In Brian Walker’s seven-minute whiteboard talk, he tells us about the “basin of 
attraction.” This establishes the boundaries within which any system can self-organize. 
The narrower and shallower the basin, the more likely turbulence will cause the system 
to spill over its boundaries and become an entirely different system. Consider a 
shallow champagne coupe. Just a little turbulence and all is lost. 
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Better is a champagne flute. The depth of the basin is more suited for containing 
turbulence. The flute’s shape intensifies and directs the internal turbulence — bubbles 
and fragrance — for our pleasure. Even more conducive to resilience is the depth and 
breadth of a red wine goblet.  The basin generously accommodates the 
turbulence needed to aerate the wine. The more complicated the vintage, the more 
vigorous the turbulence, the more satisfying the taste.   
Two years ago, at the now traditional World Bank riot, a police commander applied a 
strategy of resilience to a tactical situation. It was toward the end of a long, hot day. A 
unit of riot police was being held in reserve outside the principal perimeter. The arrival 
of a television crew attracted an anarchist flash team intending to charge the police.  
Just as the anarchists finished the short war-dance that typically precedes a charge, 
the police commander barked into his radio, “Disperse!” The line of dark visors turned 
sharply toward their boss. Again he shouted, “Disperse!” And this time he waved his 
arms and wiggled his fingers as if to say, anywhere, I don’t care. The thin blue line 
dissolved. 
The anarchists, all pumped up from their noisy huddle, no longer had a target. They 
looked around in confusion. Their shoulders slumped. The television crew drove on. The 
turbulence had been given the space it needed to reach a new, but recognizable, 
heterostasis. 
Gordon Allport, a leading twentieth century psychologist, argued that human beings 
are able to transcend homeostatic bias. We can actively and creatively embrace tension 
as a means for change and personal growth. In choosing how to engage our environment 
– especially in organizing our choices around values and goals – we can change the set-
point for social and psychological equilibrium.33 Humans and our societies are, or can 
be, heterostatic. 
In developing and implementing a strategy of resilience we seek to deepen and widen 
the boundaries in which turbulence can occur while maintaining the essential function 
and form of our current system. Has this been — is this now — the goal of the 
PALIN, RESILIENCE 
        
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
	  
18	  
Department of Homeland Security? Does this resonate with the goals and objectives of 
the component agencies of the Department of Homeland Security? Is this a major 
outcome of our homeland security planning, training, exercising, grant-making, and 
preparedness programs? 
With a few possible exceptions, the answer has to be no. If any consistent 
strategy can be discerned it has much more to do with suppressing the likelihood of 
turbulence and responding to the messy consequences of turbulence, rather than 
accommodating the possibility (probability) of turbulence. In homeland security we 
have been much more focused on resisting change than adopting resilience. 
A major impediment to an authentic and meaningful adoption of resilience is the 
genesis-role of terrorism in spawning homeland security. We have fought – are fighting 
– a war against terrorists. As Liddell Hart explained, there are certain strategies 
appropriate for winning wars. There are others focused on securing the peace.34 
Resilience alone is not sufficient to succeed in the present war. We must go beyond 
resilience to constrain our adversaries, reduce their capabilities, preempt planned 
attacks, and protect ourselves. But we are unlikely to be entirely successful. The 
adversary can be foiled a thousand times. Disaster can unfold from a single failure. As 
President Obama warned in Oslo, “Terrorism has long been a tactic, but modern 
technology allows a few small men with outsized rage to murder innocents on a horrific 
scale.”35 
Resilience is uniquely suited to preserving our strategic advantage in the midst of 
such failure or in the case of natural and accidental disasters. Whatever the target of 
turbulence (physical, psychological, economic, political, cultural, or all-encompassing) a 
strategy of resilience dissipates the impact. 
Resilience opens space for turbulence to swirl. Freedom and diversity extends this 
space. Resilience is reinforced by participation, collaboration, and shared deliberation in 
a multi-layered democracy and multi-dimensional civil society. Strong networks of 
family, friends, and neighbors are the building blocks of resilience.  
In physics and mathematics the end-state of resilience is restored equilibrium. In our 
social context resilience is not so much a matter of maintaining equilibrium as creatively 
accommodating turbulence to achieve heterostatic outcomes. Returning to the working 
definition of resilience offered above, our strategic goal is to absorb – even to benefit 
from – disruption, self-organize in response, and learn to adapt effectively to new 
conditions. For me that is a good summary of the core attributes of the American 
national character… and our fundamental comparative advantage. 
 
Philip J. Palin is a risk strategist in private practice. He is the principal author of the 
Catastrophe Preparation and Prevention series from McGraw-Hill. Other publications include 
Consequence Management (2008) and Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence, Risk (2009). Mr. 
Palin chaired the General Preparedness Working Group of the Obama presidential campaign’s 
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Homeland Security Advisory Council.  He is a former college president, foundation executive, 
and corporate Chief Executive Officer. Mr. Palin can be contacted at ppalin@nisp.us.  
 
In adapting “The Long Blog” for the Homeland Security Affairs Journal, Mr. Palin expresses his 
appreciation for the critique and suggestions of several, including: Derek Armitage, Gary Barker, 
Christopher Bellavita, Arnold Bogis, Mark Chubb, William Cumming, Alis Gumbiner, Patricia 
Longstaff, and Robert Winslow.  Responsibility for the final draft remains entirely with Philip J. 
Palin. 
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